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Transnational Class Agency and
European Governance: The Case of
the European Round Table of
Industrialists
BASTIAAN VAN APELDOORN
This article analyses the political and ideological agency of an emergent
European transnational capitalist class in the socioeconomic governance of the
European Union (EU) by examining the case of the European Round Table of
Industrialists (ERT). It seeks to show that the ERT—as an elite forum mediating
the interests and power of the most transnationalised segments of European
capital—has played a signi cant role in shaping European governance in as
much as it has successfully articulated and promoted ideas and concepts that
have at critical times set the political agenda and, beyond, have helped to shape
the discourse within which European policy making is embedded. Here, the
increasingly neoliberal orientation of the ERT re ects, and at the same time is
a constitutive element within, the construction of a new European order in which
governance is geared to serve the interests of a globalising transnational
capitalist elite, and hence the exigencies of global ‘competitiveness’. Although
in recent years some detailed work has been done on the role of the ERT in the
internal market programme, there has as yet been little attention paid to (and thus
interpretation of) the content of the ideas promoted by the ERT and hence to the
ideological power that this forum of transnational capitalists exercises.1
The article is divided into four main parts. The  rst brie y elaborates the
theoretical framework that informs my analysis. Drawing upon what has come
to be labelled the ‘neo-Gramscian school’ in International Relations (IR), I will
advance a historical materialist understanding of the dynamics of European
integration, emphasising in particular the role of transnational social forces—as
engendered by the capitalist production process—in the political and ideological
struggles over European order.2 The second part introduces the case of the
European Round Table. I will claim that the ERT is neither a simple business
lobby nor a corporatist interest association, but must rather be interpreted as
having developed into an elite platform for an emergent European transnational
capitalist class from which it can formulate a common strategy and—on the
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basis of that strategy—seek to shape European socioeconomic governance
through its privileged access to the European institutions . It is this latter role of
the ERT that will be the focus of the  nal two parts. As such, the third presents
an analysis of the evolution of ERT’s strategic project and the initiating role the
Round Table played in the relaunching of the integration process from Europe
1992 to Maastricht. Following this, the fourth part will analyse the ideological
orientation and strategic outlook of today’s Round Table and its current role in
shaping what I will call the neoliberal discourse of competitiveness which, I
argue, increasingly underpins European governance.
Transnationalisation , capitalist class strategy and European governance
In its focus on the strategic role of a transnational capitalist class in shaping
European socioeconomic governance the following analysis goes beyond the
established approaches to the study of European integration—in particular the
still dominant rival perspectives of intergovernmentalism versus supranational-
ism—in several respects.3 First, conventional integration theories tend to focus
largely on the institutiona l form of the integration process, thus ignoring the
question of its socioeconomic content, or the ‘social purpose’ underlying
European order.4 Whereas intergovernmentalist s and supranationalist s quarrel
over the relative power of, respectively, national and supranational public
authorities in the decision-making process, a focus on the social purpose of
European integration calls for an understanding of the social power underpinning
public power and thus for an analysis of the underlying social forces.
Second, established integration theories tend to suffer from a narrow rational-
ism that disables them from acknowledging the power of ideas and ideological
practices in the construction of European order and in de ning its social
purpose.5 There, however, our analysis cannot stop as we have to examine how,
by whom, and for what purpose that discourse has been constructed. From a
Gramscian perspective it is emphasised that ideas must be located in social
practice and thus cannot be separated from the (social) structures in which actors
are located and which shape their agency. Ideas are produced by human agency
in the context of social power relations and are, as such, bound up with the
strategic action of social actors.
Third, whereas in intergovernmentalis t accounts the transnational level is
ignored altogether, supranationalis t approaches do explicitly acknowledge the
role of transnational actors but tend to see that role as subservient to the alleged
functional logic of the integration process and/or the supranational leadership of
the European Commission, thus denying the autonomy of these actors.6 The
point of departure for the present analysis is that the social forces underpinning
European order are not necessarily internal to the EU or its member states but
must rather be located within a global political economy in which capitalist
production and  nance are undergoing a sustained transnationalisatio n and
globalisation , re ected inter alia in the increasing dominance of the transnational
corporation (TNC) as an actor in the world economy and the concomitant
growing structural power of transnational capital.7 This transnationalisatio n of
global capitalism can be argued to engender a transnationalisatio n of social
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Transnationa l Class Agency and European Governance
forces, in particular, those forces bound up with transnationalising and globalis-
ing capital. In what, following the pioneering work of Kees van der Pijl and
others, can be conceptualised as a process of transnational class formation, we
witness the rise of transnational capitalist elites as key actors in global politics.8
In its focus on class agency, this article also aims to contribute to a research
agenda that reclaims the centrality of class agency in the study of political
economy. The class-theoretical premise underlying this agenda is that the class
domination by which capitalist societies are characterised cannot be understood
from a structuralist perspective that merely focuses on the structural domination
of capital over labour, but rather that the reproduction of this power of
capital—and of the capitalist class—has to be explained also in terms of
collective human agency within concrete social power struggles taking place on
the structural terrain of the accumulation process. As Leslie Sklair puts it,
‘[capitalist] class hegemony does not simply happen as if by magic. The
capitalist class expends much time, energy and resources to make it happen and
to ensure that it keeps on happening’.9
The transnational capitalist class engendered by the globalisation of capitalist
accumulation is not conceived here as a unitary actor. In fact, signi cant
differences in ideological and strategic orientations may exist within the ranks of
this class—differences related to structural (but not  xed) divisions within
capital.10 The important point for the purpose of this article—which focuses on
the role of transnational class strategy in European governance—is that through
the political organisation of capitalist class elites these differences can be
(temporarily) transcended and a unity of purpose and direction achieved, a unity
that may then be elevated to a higher plane, that is, constituting an appeal across
different groups and classes (and class fractions), thus entering into the struggle
for—to use a Gramscian term—hegemony.11 In this process of capitalist class
formation, transnational elite groups and their (informal) organisations are seen
as playing a key role.12 This article interprets the European Round Table of
Industrialist s as one such organisation with respect to the process of transna-
tional class formation in Europe.
The political agency of the ERT must be located, however, within a wider
con guration of social forces dominated and cemented by a globalising transna-
tional elite consisting primarily of the top managers and owners of transnational
capital, but also of politicians and civil servants occupying key positions in
transnationalisin g state structures. In the emergent transnational state–society
complex of the EU we may thus start to discern the contours of a transnational
power bloc at the apex of which we  nd a transnational capitalist class elite
allying with the more outward-looking elements of ‘EU government’, the
European Commission in particular. As the case of the ERT will show, parallel
to the relaunching of the integration process—and marking a sharp contrast with
the relatively antagonistic relations of the 1970s—the mid 1980s and 1990s
witnessed the development of what has been described as a ‘partnership’
between big business and the Commission. The other side of the coin of this
partnership was and is the extreme weakness of organised labour within the
Euro-polity, where it can make for much less of a counterveiling force than at
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the national level where capital is to some degree ‘locked into’ (neo)corporatist
structures.13
The strategic alliance between the corporate executives of Europe’s leading
TNCs and the political executives of the Commission that emerges from our
analysis of the ERT can be seen as indicative of the growing power of
transnational capital and is further facilitated both by the position of the
Commission within the overall structure of EU governance as well as the nature
of the EU polity in general. With regard to the  rst point, although the
Commission has the right of initiative (and can thus to an important degree
shape the EU agenda), the fact that its policy making is dependent upon the
decision-making power of the Council of Ministers, and hence upon the veto
power of individual member states, means that it is often crucial for the
Commission to enlist the support of powerful social groups. With regard to the
second point, the undemocratic nature of the EU polity in general—including its
underdeveloped system of political parties and lack of other institutions , such as
strong organised interest groups, that can generate not just legitimacy but indeed
also the demand for legitimacy and (democratic) accountability—makes it easier
for the Commission to rely rather exclusively on ‘business advice’ without
needing to legitimate this. Indeed, one could argue that the democratic de cit of
the EU, on the one hand, and the increasing dominance of social forces bound
up with transnational capital and its largely neoliberal project, on the other, are
two sides of the same coin in as much as the former can be seen as re ecting
a wider phenomenon that Stephen Gill calls the ‘new constitutionalism ’. This he
de nes as ‘the politico-legal dimension of the wider discourse of disciplinary
neoliberalism’ seeking ‘to separate economic policies from broad political
accountability in order to make governments more responsive to the discipline
of market forces and correspondingly less responsive to popular-democratic
forces and processes’.14 It is within this context that we must place our analysis
of the ERT and its role in European governance.
The ERT: an elite platform for Europe’s transnational capitalist class
I would consider the Round Table to be more than a lobby group
as it helps to shape policies. The Round Table’s relationship with
Brussels is one of strong co-operation. It is a dialogue which often
begins at a very early stage in the development of policies and
directives.
Wisse Dekker, former Chairman of the ERT15
The ERT is not a lobby, but rather a group of European citizens
who express their opinions on the best ways to make Europe and
European companies competitive on a world-wide basis to politi-
cians, governments, the Commission, and other institutions .
Je´roˆme Monod, former Chairman of the ERT16
The ERT is partially a lobby, but not for the interests of
individual sectors, but for the competitiveness of Europe. As this
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Transnationa l Class Agency and European Governance
is a fundamental concern, which the European public authorities
share with us, we are also a privileged partner in the dialogue
about these concerns.
Helmut Maucher, current Chairman of the ERT17
When integration was at a low point in the early 1980s and growing global
(mainly Japanese and US) competition threatened the position of large sections
of European industry, leading members of Europe’s business community began
to perceive the need for a European-level political initiative that was lacking
from Europe’s politicians. As Europe’s of cial employers’ organisation, UNICE,
was deemed to be ineffective, it was at the initiative of Pehr Gyllenhammar, the
cosmopolitan chief executive of cer (CEO) of Volvo, and with the support of
Etienne Davignon, the European Commissioner who had been instrumental in
creating the new rapprochement between big business and the Commission in
the preceding years, that 17 industrialist s of major European companies came
together in 1983 to found the Round Table of European Industrialist s (later
ERT).18 The self-proclaimed aim of the new organisation was ‘to revitalise
European industry and make it competitive again, and to speed up the process
of uni cation of the European market’,19 two goals that became part of a single
strategy in which ‘Europeanisation’ was seen as the answer to European
industry’s lack of global competitiveness.
Today, the ERT consists of 45 CEOs and chairmen of Europe’s most
transnational and biggest industrial corporations, with almost all EU countries as
well as most industrial sectors ‘represented’ (see Table 1 for current member-
ship).20 The membership of the ERT is personal (rather than corporate), but is
at the same time dependent on the member’s continued position as the CEO or
chairman of his company. As a senior of cial21 of the ERT explained: ‘we insist
that it is the chief decision maker who is the member, for the simple reason that
eventually these great men, when they have decided something around the table,
have to go home and put their mouth and their money to the policies.’22 Looking,
then, at the capital behind the private ‘European citizens’ (remember Monod’s
observation above), we  nd that 36 companies of the current 45 members appear
on The Financial Times’ Europe 500 (which ranks Europe’s companies by
market capitalisation and therefore excludes companies that are not publicly
quoted) and 20 are amongst the top 100.23 On a global level, Fortune’s Global
500, which ranks companies by total sales, lists 27 companies of ERT mem-
bers.24 We are thus dealing here with a group of Europe’s largest non- nancial
enterprises. As such, the ERT membership makes up a substantial part of
Europe’s corporate elite, the internal coherence of which is established and
maintained through a process of networking, inter alia through organisations like
the ERT.25
Although but one of many European business groups, the ERT occupies a
unique place within the EU’s evolving landscape of ‘transnational pluralism’.26
The agency of the ERT falls neither under the logic of pluralist lobbying nor that
of corporatist interest intermediation,27 but should instead be interpreted as the
elite organisation of an emergent European transnational capitalist class, articu-
lating and defending the long-term interests of this class.28 As such, the ERT
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must also be distinguished from the kind of ‘functional’ interest groups that early
integration theorists expected to be instrumental to the functional logic of the
integration process, and in which category we would, for instance,  nd UNICE.
Whereas UNICE is the of cial European federation of national employers’
associations and as such has a public and formal (‘corporatist’) role to play
vis-a`-vis the Commission and as a ‘social partner’ in the dialogue with the
European Trade Union Federation (ETUC), ERT is not an interest association at
all. In contrast to corporatist organisations, the ERT has no members either to
represent or to discipline. Rather, the ERT is its members. As Vice-Chairman of
the ERT, Gerhard Cromme, who formerly also had a leading position within
UNICE, puts it:
The European Round Table is a forum in which European
business leaders meet … we are not an association, we are not an
interest group … and we also do not engage in lobbying in that
sense but leave that to the relevant institutions … UNICE is an
association of interest representation whereas ERT is not … [but
is] a private gathering of people who discuss themes and then try
to arrive at a common opinion.29
As many ERT members and associates emphasise, these organisational char-
acteristics of the ERT—a private and relatively small club of the heads of
Europe’s largest corporations—give the ERT a number of advantages over
formal associations.30 First, compared to big cross-sectoral associations repre-
senting several ‘constituencies’, the Round Table has less diverging interests to
balance and can act with relative speed and  exibility. Moreover, unlike UNICE
which, as the of cial voice of business, has to respond to the details of all
proposed EU regulation, the ERT is free to ‘set the political highlights ’
according to its preferences.31
Second, the fact that the members themselves are the Round Table and that
these members control Europe’s biggest companies gives the ERT a power that
at least in its immediacy cannot be matched by any interest group where power
is mediated through a bureaucracy of representation. In consequence, according
to another prominent ERT member, who also had a leadership position within
UNICE, the Round Table ‘tends to be taken more seriously’, precisely ‘because
it is the big industrial leaders [themselves] who go and talk with the Commis-
sioners’.32 The ERT’s privileged political access is also underlined by Peter
Sutherland, now ERT member, but also a prominent former Commissioner (for
competition) under the  rst Delors Presidency, who said in an interview:
I think that the importance of the ERT is not merely in the fact
that it co-ordinates and creates a cohesive approach amongst
major industries in Europe but because the persons who are
members of it have to be at the highest level of companies and
virtually all of them have unimpeded access to government
leaders because of the position of their companies…. That is
exactly what makes it different [from other organisations]—the
fact that it is at head of company level, and only the biggest
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companies in each country of the European Union are members
of it. So, by de nition, each member of the ERT has access at the
highest level to government.33
Third, the ERT’s elite character allows it to play a more strategic and pro-active
role, one that transcends lobbying or interest representation in a more restricted
sense. The ERT does more than defend relatively clear-cut (narrow) corporate
interests: it rather seeks to de ne the general class interests of transnational
(industrial) capital, that is, to formulate a relatively long-term and forward-look-
ing strategy oriented towards the shaping of European socioeconomic gover-
nance.34 As former ERT Vice-Chairman, David Simon, explained, precisely
because it brings together around ‘45 bosses who run businesses, they [the ERT
members] will tend to take a more strategic view than an association … because,
after all, that’s what they’re responsible for, they’re responsible for direction and
strategy. [The ERT thus] tries to concentrate on strategy and direction for the
economy at large’.35
The political agency of the ERT
Although occasionally also engaging in more conventional lobbying activities as
well, ERT’s agency normally transcends that level in as much as it seeks to set
the political agenda and, beyond that, to shape the discourse in which European
decision making is embedded.36 Such an exercise of ideological power is what
distinguishe s the ERT most clearly from more traditional business lobbies. The
ERT communicates its ideas in different ways. It regularly publishes reports on
either speci c themes or of a more comprehensive nature, and frequently sends
letters and communique´s to individual politicians or to collective bodies such as
the European Council. But, as Keith Richardson, ERT’s former Secretary
General, points out, ‘the most in uential mode of all is perhaps still face-to-face
communication’ between the CEOs of the ERT and Europe’s leading politicians
and policy makers.37 At the intergovernmental level, the ERT operates mainly
through its individual members. In this respect it is signi cant that the ERT
consciously recruits from all member states. Furthermore, in conjunction with its
six-monthly plenary session, the ERT also always meets (usually around a
dinner) with several prominent members (normally including the prime minister)
of the government then taking over the Council presidency on the eve of the
Council summit. At the supranational level, this transnational elite interaction is
probably even stronger. A Round Table delegation generally meets the Com-
mission president about twice a year rather formally.38 In addition, ERT
members often have more ad hoc meetings with various Commissioners. This
direct personal access to the Commission is probably facilitated by the fact that
the Round Table has always had one or two former Commissioners amongst its
membership, most notably Etienne Davignon from 1986 onwards and, more
recently, Peter Sutherland who joined as chairman of BP (while also serving as
the chair of the European arm of Wall Street’s quintessentia l investment bank,
Goldman Sachs).39 At the national level, former ERT Vice Chairman, David
Simon, recently made the reverse step, that is, from business (and membership
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of the ERT) to government, by becoming a minister for trade and competitive-
ness in Europe in the new UK Labour government, making him, in the words
of one senior ERT associate, ‘a very useful contact’.40
In sum, what we see developing around the ERT is a transnational elite
network that ties together the elite of European business with key policy makers
and politicians at both the national and supranational levels of the European
polity. In the remainder of this article I will examine how the ERT has used this
position to shape European socioeconomic governance.
The ERT’s evolving strategic project and the relaunching of Europe
The relaunching of European integration with the internal market programme has
been interpreted by intergovernmentalist s as the result of a convergence of
national policy preferences enabling successful intergovernmental bargaining
and by supranationalist s as driven by the policy-entrepreneurshi p of the Com-
mission, operating in alliance with transnational business (but the latter playing
a merely supportive role) and responding to Europe’s perceived economic
decline after the end of the ‘golden age’.41 I maintain that, if we want to
understand the socioeconomic content of the relaunched integration process, we
have to understand it as the outcome of political struggle, not so much between
states but between social forces (who may be ‘represented’ by a variety of
actors) developing strategies and engaging in a struggle over European order at
all levels of Europe’s polity.42 As indicated, the most dominant of these social
forces increasingly operate within a transnational setting, in particular, an
emergent transnational capitalist class.
Taking the relaunching of Europe from the mid 1980s onwards as the
historical context I claim that one can identify three rival projects within the
subsequent transnational struggle over Europe’s social purpose.43 In the neolib-
eral project—which  rst found ideological expression in the early 1980s in the
‘Eurosclerosis’ discourse—the relaunching of the integration process was con-
ceived as an opportunity to further open up the European region to the
globalising world economy and, moreover, to accelerate the deregulation and
privatisation of the European economies, thus liberating the ‘bene cial’ forces of
the market from the fetters of government intervention and other ‘rigidifying’
institutions impeding the necessary adjustments to a changing global environ-
ment. The bene ts of the internal market project were thus seen as principally
deriving from the freer market it would create, emphasising its deregulatory
effects and expected ef ciency gains.
Advocates of the neomercantilist project in contrast blamed Europe’s loss of
international competitiveness less on labour market rigidity, trade union power
or the welfare state, and more on the fragmentation of the European market,
insuf cient economies of scale and the perceived technology gap vis-a`-vis the
USA and Japan, all in a context of intensifying global competition. This project
thus constituted a more defensive regionalisation strategy in which the internal
market was conceived as the creation of a European ‘home market’ in which
(would-be) ‘European champions’ would be able—thanks to the larger econom-
ies of scale—successfully to confront the growing non-European competition.
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Such a regeneration of European industry was to be further promoted by an
active pan-European industrial policy, in particular in the area of new technolo-
gies, of which a protectionist European trade policy was often advocated as a
(temporarily) necessary complement.44
The social democratic project,  nally, sought to re-embed the new European
market in a supranational framework of social regulation and thus protect and
consolidate the so-called ‘European social model’. This project developed within
the context of the initial success of the internal market programme as social
democrats came to see European federalism as the answer to the dilemmas of the
European left in an era of globalisation and was advocated most prominently by
Jacques Delors, who as President of the Commission sought to move the
integration process beyond market-integration and towards state-building , hence
promoting his vision of an ‘organised capitalism’.45
Neoliberalism and neomercantilism can be interpreted as contending strategies
on the part of rival groups or ‘fractions’ within the ranks of Europe’s emergent
transnational capitalist class. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s the main
dividing line within this transnational elite was between, on the one hand, a
‘globalist’ fraction consisting of Europe’s most globalised  rms (including
global  nancial institutions) and, on the other hand, a ‘Europeanist’ fraction
made up of large industrial enterprises primarily serving the European market
and competing against the often cheaper imports from outside Europe.46 The
perspective of the former has tended towards neoliberalism, whereas the latter
came to promote neomercantilism. Although they aspired to become more
global, in the 1980s many of Europe’s large industrial  rms were still more
regional TNCs. The ERT in this period was also dominated by this ‘Europeanist’
fraction and its strategic orientation thus tended towards a defensive regionalism,
the heart of which was the promotion of a big (and if necessary protected)
European home market.47
From Europe ’92 to Maastricht
ERT’s campaign for a completion of the internal market was launched right after
its founding in 1983 with a memorandum to Commissioner Davignon in which
the Round Table stated that ‘Europe remains a group of separated national
markets [which] prevents many  rms from reaching the scale necessary to resist
pressure from non-European competitors. The European market must serve as a
uni ed “home” base necessary to allow European  rms to develop as powerful
competitors in world markets’.48 Although plans for the completion of the
internal market had been circulating within the Commission for years, concrete
progress was not made and it was in this respect that the pro-European offensive
on the part of the Round Table had a very signi cant impact.49 Indeed, ERT
members were among the  rst within Europe’s elite to publicly propose a
European solution—in contrast to the then dominant national (champion)
industrial strategies—to Europe’s economic woes. Whereas up to the mid 1980s
‘Europessimism’ was still pervasive, the ERT warned in a 1985 report against
the danger of the idea of Europe’s decline ‘being etched permanently into a new
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European consciousness’ and concluded that ‘Europe is not locked into de-
cline—the exit doors are wide open. It remains only to go through them’.50
The basis of ERT’s agenda-setting role with regard to what came to be the
Europe 1992 programme had been a plan presented in late 1984 and early 1985
by the then CEO of Philips, and founding member and later chairman of the
Round Table, Wisse Dekker, which laid out a detailed programme for the
creation of a ‘European Community Home Market’ by 1990. Dekker’s ‘agenda
for action’—which was quickly adopted by the whole Round Table—has been
said by many to have directly inspired the Commission White Paper of June
1985.51 Indeed, the critical role the ERT played in this respect has been
acknowledged by several of the actors involved. Former Commissioner Peter
Sutherland, for instance, has stated:
I believe that it [the ERT] did play a signi cant role in the
development of the 1992 programme. In fact one can argue that
the whole completion of the internal market project was initiated
not by governments but by the Round Table, and by members of
it, Dekker in particular, and Philips playing a signi cant role and
some others … And I think it played a fairly consistent role
subsequently in dialoguing with the Commission on practical
steps to implement market liberalisation .52
Although the ERT was thus instrumental in relaunching the European project by
rallying around the idea of a uni ed European market, the internal market that
was created on the basis of the White Paper did not turn out to be the kind of
home market that many of the early Round Table members (of the ‘Europeanist’
fraction) had envisaged, that is, a relatively protected market in which Euro-
champions could prosper in order to confront the global competition. The
internal market did favour the creation of further economies of scale and did
make the European market a home market more comparable to that of the USA
and Japan. In the end, however, the internal market programme was hardly
supported by the kind of ‘ anking’ policies that the neomercantilists had
advocated. Responding to the demands of, among others, (members of) the ERT,
the Commission did launch intra-European cooperation programmes in R&D,
such as ESPRIT, and also later started to promote the development of trans-Eu-
ropean infrastructure networks (TENs). Such policies, however, fell far short of
any neomercantilist industrial relance. The fears of a protectionist Europe also
turned out to be unfounded. Although those sectors of European industry—in
particular, cars and electronics—that lobbied the hardest for protectionist mea-
sures53 had their demands partially met, these limited protectionist policies have
since gradually been ended, accelerating the integration of the EU into the global
economy.54
In the transnational struggle over Europe’s relaunching, neoliberal social
forces can thus be seen gradually to have gained the upper hand over those that
had favoured a neomercantilist interpretation of the internal market. This
struggle had also been fought out within the ranks of Europe’s transnational
business elite, as united within the ERT, in which the ‘Europeanist’ fraction
slowly lost its dominant position and moreover itself gradually abandoned its
168
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
0:
48
 2
7 
Ma
y 
20
11
Transnationa l Class Agency and European Governance
earlier neomercantilist perspective.55 Not only did many globalist companies join
the Round Table, but also the older ERT companies that were formerly still more
oriented towards and dependent upon the European market became more global
themselves.56 This shifting balance of power between the globalist and ‘Eu-
ropeanist’ camps must, however, also be seen in the context of the rising
dominance of neoliberal ideology within the European political economy and the
appeal neoliberalism gained as an alternative strategy after the political failure
of the neomercantilist project. Concomitant, then, to the changing composition
of its membership, the ideological and strategic orientation of the ERT gradually
shifted away from a protective Europeanism and towards a neoliberal globalism.
The broadening of ERT’s membership with the addition of many prominent
exponents of the globalist fraction (such as the heads of global giants like
Unilever, Shell, BP and La Roche) also allowed the Round Table to develop
more into an elite forum for the whole of an emergent European transnational
capitalist class. The ERT of the 1990s thus became a forum within which this
class came to rede ne its interests along neoliberal lines and from which it has
sought to shape European governance accordingly.
A  rst testimony to the ERT’s shift away from its earlier protective regionalist
orientation can be found in its September 1991 report Reshaping Europe—even
if this still also contained many elements that revealed an as yet uneasy
compromise between globalists and ‘Europeanists’—in which it presented its
blueprint for the post-1989 European order in the run-up to the Treaty of
Maastricht.57 In the report the ERT called for both a widening and a deepening
(and in this sense still going beyond a neoliberal conception) of the European
integration process, with monetary union singled out as the most important next
step. However, support for the single currency was not equally strong amongst
all members.58 The French and Italian members were strongly in favour, whereas
most Germans and British were still only lukewarm. Reshaping Europe—
re ecting part of the old neomercantilist agenda, albeit in recast form—further-
more advocated an ‘effective industrial policy’, giving ‘top priority’ to the
so-called TENs.
In contrast to the 1992 project, the ERT’s direct involvement in the Maastricht
process was limited in as much as the initiative seemed to have been taken over
again by Europe’s politicians, no longer needing business interests to prod them
along the path of deepening integration. Indeed, one can argue that Maastricht
was partly the result of a kind of ‘spill-over’ from the success of Europe 1992
and the temporary ‘Europhoria’ to which it had led.59 In as much, then, as the
ERT had played an initiating role with regard to the internal market programme
one can argue, by that very fact, that it also helped to set the stage and create
the pre-conditions for the second phase of Europe’s ‘relaunch’. Moreover, when
we analyse the (socioeconomic) content of the Maastricht treaty, we encounter
several of the ideas that the ERT, or at least part of the ERT membership, had
been pushing for years, in particular, the idea of monetary union as a necessary
complement to the internal market, as well as an enhanced European role in
infrastructure and R&D. Moreover, other parts of the treaty, most notably the
social protocol, were not only testimony to the efforts of social democratic forces
to put this on the agenda, but as much, if not more, to the role of transnational
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capital—represented inter alia by the ERT—in watering it down and seeing to
it that this minimal programme would only be minimally implemented.60 There
is no doubt that the ERT made quite extensive use of its high-level contacts to
promote its agenda. Delors got an advance copy of the Reshaping Europe
report61 and there were several consultations between the ERT and important
Commissioners like Frans Andriessen, Ray MacSharry, Sir Leon Brittan and
Delors himself, that is, with people ‘to which we [the ERT] could explain our
views on the Maastricht process’.62 At the national level there were similar
consultations between individual members of the ERT and key policy makers of
the respective national governments.63
With regard to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) it has to be pointed out
that, as a strong consensus was lacking, the ERT could not push so strongly for
EMU as some members would have liked. However, these members did organise
themselves in a separate organisation called the Association for Monetary Union
of Europe (AMUE). Amongst the core membership of AMUE we  nd many
ERT companies such as Fiat, Philips, Siemens and Total, whereas prominent
(former) ERT members, such as former Vice Chairman Andre´ Leysen, Giovanni
Agnelli (Fiat) and Etienne Davignon, are long-serving members of AMUE’s
governing board.64 From the start, the industrialists of AMUE had close contacts
with the Commission, and in particular with Delors, in their efforts to promote
monetary integration. At a joint press conference of a delegation of AMUE
(consisting of the CEOs of Fiat, Philips, Solvay and Total) and Delors, the latter
expressed his appreciation of the ‘very important’ support of AMUE and stated
that ‘company managers not only follow us, but often precede us’.65 Already in
April 1988—two months before the Delors Committee, which subsequently
prepared the way for EMU, was set up—AMUE presented a detailed blueprint
for monetary union and in the following years published annual surveys
indicating wide business support across Europe.66 On the eve of the Hanover
summit, at which the Delors Committee was created, AMUE sent a communique´
to the government leaders expressing their support for the creation of an
independent European Central Bank.67 Although more research needs to be
carried out on the role of AMUE, it is at least evident that a large section of
transnational business had effectively organised itself to help to set the agenda
with regard to monetary union. Moreover, the close connections between the
ERT and AMUE do suggest that it is by and large the same elite of European
transnational capital that has constituted at least one powerful interest pushing
for both Europe 1992 and EMU.
At a more abstract level, the (socioeconomic) content of Maastricht can be
interpreted as re ecting the transnational con guration of social and political
forces within the European political economy at the end of the 1980s. The
Round Table here represented important sections of the ruling elite within that
con guration and, as such, was one important forum from which that elite could
shape the debates that at the ideological level conditioned the political bargain-
ing process. However, it was in the run-up to Maastricht that the social
democratic project led by Delors also temporarily gained momentum and at least
partly helped to set the agenda for Maastricht, even if that agenda in the end
largely failed to materialise.68 Maastricht was neither a triumph for Thatcherite
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hyperliberalism , nor the social democratic vision nor, for that matter, the
neomercantilist strategy, but in fact contained elements of all three rival projects,
even though it was biased in favour of the neoliberal project given the neoliberal
orthodoxy underpinning the convergence criteria of EMU. Since Maastricht,
however, the evolving European regime of socioeconomic governance has
witnessed a further shift towards ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ as the austerity race
to meet the convergence criteria put even more people out of work and placed
further strains on the welfare state. The EU further integrated itself into a global
free trade regime under the new World Trade Organization (WTO) and ‘compet-
itiveness’—increasingly narrowly de ned as the freedom for transnational capi-
tal to maximise (short-term) pro t—became the primary ‘benchmark’ for
European public policy. Below I will argue that in the construction of this new
European order we can once more observe the political and ideological agency
of the ERT.
The ERT’s neoliberal offensive: shaping the discourse of European socio-
economic governance
After Maastricht the ERT’s neoliberal shift has been further consolidated as is
revealed by reports that have increasingly come to focus on deregulation, labour
market  exibility and downsizing the public sector, along with even more
unequivocal expressions of its commitment to global free trade.69 With regard to
ERT’s strengthened free trade orientation, the crucial battle was probably that
over the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT trade talks (in
December 1993), which in retrospect probably signalled the  nal defeat of the
‘Europrotectionists ’, both within the Round Table and the European capitalist
class more widely.70 After having reached internal unity on this point, the Round
Table subsequently intensi ed its lobby campaign for a speedy conclusion of the
trade negotiations and was probably one of the more important actors instrumen-
tal in changing the position of the French government.71 According to the then
director of the GATT, Peter Sutherland, ‘the ERT was active and supportive of
the Uruguay Round at the later stage when I was at the WTO’.72 The
post-Maastricht period also witnessed a deepening of the consensus in favour of
monetary union, with the Round Table becoming more active in supporting this
project.73 The crises of the European Monetary System in 1992 and 1993
convinced, in particular, the Germans that the ‘Deutschmarkzone’ did not
provide suf cient stability. Moreover, the neoliberal wing of the Round Table
has also come to be more convinced of the virtues of EMU, principally because
of the ‘salutary’ disciplinary effects the EMU criteria have so far had, and
continue to have, on the socioeconomic policies of Europe’s national govern-
ments.74
In short, the emphasis on the positive role of market forces has never been so
strong as in current Round Table discourse. The ERT of today stresses that we
live in a new world, in which ‘nothing can be done today the same way as we
did it yesterday; that is what we mean by “ exibility” and “freedom” ’.75 It is in
the area of social and labour market policies that ERT’s discourse has become
most explicitly neoliberal. Well aware of the negative employment effects of the
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cost-cutting accumulation strategies that their companies have now adopted, the
ERT capitalists in a 1993 report gloomily warned that ‘a hard core of persistent
unemployment will remain into the next century’, but added that this core might
yet be reduced if Europe is willing to ‘ exibilize and upgrade the supply of
labour.’76 The former is de ned primarily in terms of external  exibility, which
means that the burden of adjustment will have to be carried by labour as the ERT
itself is in fact frank enough to admit: ‘[a] very large amount of the effort to
adjust European labour markets will rely on labour’.77 In the end, the desired
‘adaptation’ of labour implies a fundamental restructuring of state–society
relations. Again the ERT is well aware of this and, speaking the language of
hegemony, it appeals for the creation of a ‘new social consensus’:
Enabling Europe to return to high employment growth requires
more than replacing policy instruments, it calls for a change of
our economic and social structures. But governments are only
able to change structures when there is a new social consensus,
i.e. the convergence on principles and, ultimately, agreement on
the goals for that change among the social partners, governments,
the opinion leaders and, ultimately, population…. We need a
consensus on the European level that only a healthy, ef cient and
competitive private sector is able to provide suf cient jobs, and
that markets should be left to allocate labour ef ciently.78
Creating this new consensus means that the existing ‘distorted [sic] social
balance’ has to be changed.79 A key concept in the discourse within which this
nascent hegemonic project of Europe’s transnational capitalist class is articulated
is that of ‘competitiveness’. Competitiveness has come to function as such a key
concept because of its potential to represent the ‘general interest’ as it appeals
equally to neoliberals, neomercantilists and social democrats alike. But what
competitiveness actually means, and how it has to be achieved, is an open
question decided in concrete struggles. Below I argue that competitiveness is
increasingly being de ned in neoliberal terms and that the ERT has been one
important forum promoting such a de nition.
The new competitiveness discourse
Competitiveness has become the keyword not only in ERT’s discourse, but in
socioeconomic discourse at large. The argument put forward here is that the ERT
has been one of the more important ‘authors’ of this competitiveness discourse
within the European context. The  rst testimony (at the EU level) of the power
of this discourse was the Delors’s White Paper on ‘Growth, Competitiveness and
Employment’, which has since become one of the main intellectual reference
points in the socioeconomic policy debate within the EU.80 Different pieces of
evidence suggest that the ERT had a signi cant input into the development of
this key Commission document.81 At the press conference after the December
1993 Brussels summit at which Delors had presented his White Paper, the then
Commission president recalled his consultation with industry and the support he
had received for his proposals from the ERT.82 The week before Delors had also
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participated in the press presentation of the ERT report Beating the Crisis which
was conceived as its contribution to the Commission’s future economic strat-
egy.83 As a senior ERT of cial commented upon the relation between these two
reports:
It was very parallel, and we saw their drafts and they saw our
drafts. And one of my friends, a very senior of cial in the
Commission, he said to me, there is basically no difference
between them … very similar, growth, investment, competitive-
ness, and employment. What we have tried to do is to get these
things  xed together in people’s minds … the message is the
same, these things all go together, you won’t  ght unemployment
if you don’t  ght for competitiveness, you won’t get growth if
you don’t have investment.84
Indeed, careful reading of the two reports does reveal some striking similarities.
Most importantly, they share the basic premise that higher growth and employ-
ment can only be achieved through promoting the competitiveness of European
industry. Moreover, the strategy (with regard to these objectives) outlined by the
White Paper also echoes that of Beating the Crisis. In the Commission docu-
ment, the road to higher employment follows a strategy based on the three
‘inseparable elements’—a ‘macroeconomic framework which instead of con-
straining market forces … supports them’, structural adjustment of policies
‘aimed at increasing the competitiveness of European industry and at removing
the rigidities which are curbing its dynamism’, and ‘active policies and structural
changes in the labour market and in the regulations’.85 Just as the concept of
industrial policy is recast in a more liberal frame, so is the Delorist vision of a
‘social Europe’ further watered down.
Notwithstanding this, Delors’s Paper was still largely an attempt at a compro-
mise between neoliberals and social democrats.86 Since then, however, compet-
itiveness has increasingly been de ned in neoliberal terms within the
Commission’s policy discourse. As indicated, the ERT has constituted a key
forum within which this neoliberal competitiveness discourse has been articu-
lated. A senior ERT of cial explained the process as follows: ‘[t]he members of
the European Round Table perceive it as their role to make some input into
policy making at the European level on those issues which are of crucial
importance for the economic strength of Europe, what we are now calling the
sort of general term of competitiveness. And competitiveness is now a useful
word but it is really like a paper bag into which you put things’.87 What the ERT
has been trying to put in the bag—that is, the meaning it has sought to attach
to the concept of competitiveness—is increasingly neoliberal in origin. The past
is revealing here. Although competitiveness as a political catchword has only
recently risen to its current heights, it was already much talked about in the
1980s. However, the meaning of competitiveness then was still primarily bound
up with a neomercantilist ideology in which it meant being able to compete in
the global market place by  rst shielding oneself from the forces of global
competition in order then to enter the fray on the basis of increased strength
achieved partly through non-market means. Now, however, competitiveness
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means survival of the  ttest in the fully open environment of a global free
market in which competitive performance is what the market measures it to be.
The ERT’s promotion of this concept of competitiveness has certainly
contributed to its wider acceptance within European governance. A  rst testi-
mony to this was the setting-up by the EU of a ‘Competitiveness Advisory
Group’ (CAG) in the beginning of 1995, just over a year after the ERT had  rst
proposed the creation of such a group.88 The CAG membership consists of
CEOs, as well as leading trade union representatives and other ‘eminent persons’
(usually former politicians), but is dominated by the former group.89 At the time
of its founding, three ERT members (Barnevik, Maljers & Simon) joined the
13 member council and at present Marco Tronchetti Provera (of Pirelli)
maintains the links between the two groups. It should not surprise us therefore
that the ‘advice’ this group has so far given (in six-monthly reports to the
European Council) closely resembles that of the ERT, with both the Round
Table and the CAG spreading the new competitiveness gospel.90 As a senior
of cial of the ERT remarked, ‘one thing that is quite important in this whole
scenario is multiplicity of messages and delivery systems around the whole
theme’.91
As an operationalisation of its competitiveness ideology, the ERT has, in
tandem with the CAG, started to promote the concept of ‘benchmarking’
vis-a`-vis the Commission and the member states. Benchmarking means ‘measur-
ing the performance’ of individual  rms, sectors, but also of nations against that
of the ‘best competitors’ in the world.92 After launching the idea, the Round
Table organised several seminars with Commission and government of cials to
promote the concept.93 In its report Benchmarking for Policy-Makers, the ERT
is very explicit about how policy makers should ‘measure’ competitiveness: the
country or (macro) region that is most competitive is the country that is most
successful in attracting mobile capital. As the report put it, ‘governments must
recognise today that every economic and social system in the world is competing
with all the others to attract the footloose businesses’.94 That the expected
outcome of this competition for transnationally mobile capital will be a deepen-
ing of neoliberal restructuring transpires from the kind of ‘benchmarks’ that are,
for instance, proposed with regard to the policy goal of creating employment: the
level of ‘labour costs … the  exibility of labour … working and factory hours
… termination costs’.95 The Maastricht criteria are also mentioned as a success-
ful application of the benchmarking concept.96 At the same time, the ideological
potential of a concept like benchmaking, and indeed its capacity to appeal to a
wider set of forces within society and to incorporate them into the emergent
hegemonic bloc, is also not lost on the Round Table capitalists as the report
stresses that benchmarking is ‘not just an analytical device’ but also ‘carries a
symbolic message’:
At a time when the European model of society is experiencing
some dif culties, and change may be perceived as painful (though
not nearly so painful as the results of not changing), the role of
symbols in mobilising human effort may become more important,
and benchmarking can be part of this.97
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Competitiveness and benchmarking have also accordingly become the key
concepts within the public (socioeconomic) policy discourse of the EU.
Analysing the policy documents of the Commission one also sees how these
concepts are mobilised to promote a programme of neoliberal restructuring
aiming to remove, in the words of the Director-General for Industry, the still
remaining ‘rigidities and distortions … that prevent Europe from fully exploiting
its potential’.98 The ERT’s promotion of the concept of benchmarking vis-a`-vis
the Commission has been particularly successful. In the same month that the
ERT published its report the Industry Directorate-General came out with a
document entitled Benchmarking the Competitiveness of European Industry in
which it suggested that benchmarking should be used as a central policy
guideline at all levels of EU governance.99 In a follow-up communication the
Commission explicitly acknowledged the input of the ERT as the  rst business
organisation to draw the Commission’s and the Council’s attention to the
benchmarking concept.100 In this communication—and at the request of the
Council of Ministers101—the Commission launched a number of concrete initia-
tives to put the concept into practice, including the establishment of a ‘High
Level Group on Benchmarking’—made up of ‘experts’ from industry—and the
initiation of a number of so-called pilot projects in different member states to
start identifying Europe’s ‘weaknesses and inef ciencies’ at the enterprise,
sectoral and public policy level (or what is referred to as ‘framework condi-
tions’).102
Invoking the inevitability of globalisation and ‘hence’ the need for adaptation,
the Commission de nes benchmarking as a tool for improving competitiveness
and for promoting ‘the convergence towards best practice’.103 This involves the
global ‘comparison of societal behaviour [sic], commercial practice, market
structure and public institutions ’.104 As the ‘High Level Group on Benchmark-
ing’—chaired by a board member of Investor, the investment company con-
trolling the global Wallenberg empire—makes clear in its  rst report, the object
of all these ‘comparisons’ is to promote rapid ‘structural reforms’ that will allow
Europe to adapt to the exigencies of globalisation: ‘this involves further
liberalisation , privatisation … more  exible labour laws, lower government
subsidies, etc.’105 Similarly, the Commission identi es labour market reform as
a ‘vital factor for the competitiveness of European industry’, calling for ‘a
radical rethink of all relevant labour market systems—employment protection,
working time, social protection, and health and safety—to adapt them to a world
of work which will be organised differently’.106
Conclusion
To sum up, then, the social purpose of the new Europe is increasingly oriented
to serve the interests of a globalising transnational capitalist class. This article
has argued that the European Round Table has developed into a key elite
organisation articulating and de ning the interests of this class and propagating
them vis-a`-vis the European institutions and within public debate. As such, it has
been claimed that the ERT has played a signi cant role in mediating the material
and ideological power of this transnational class and thus in contributing to the
neoliberal transformation of European order. Nevertheless, capital too, and in
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particular industrial capital, cannot live by the logic of what Karl Polanyi called
the self-regulating market alone, but needs supporting government policies and
social (non-market) institutions in order to accumulate wealth.107 These
con icting requirements of capital may work themselves out in different ways,
depending on the prevalent con guration of social forces. Given the preponder-
ance of globalising transnational capital within that con guration the con ict for
now is settled in favour of ‘the principle of economic liberalism’ and all its
socially uprooting effects.108 Still, at least within continental Europe, the neolib-
eral project has yet fully to disembed the European market economy from its
postwar social and political institutions . On the one hand, primacy lies with
freedom of capital and markets, implying that the postwar ‘European model’
needs to be fundamentally restructured. On the other hand, it is recognised that
this restructuring process cannot take place overnight and that it will have to be
a gradual process in which a high degree of social consensus is maintained.
These limits to a fully- edged (laissez-faire) neoliberalism are even acknowl-
edged by the ERT, which, after all, is predominantly a club of transnational
industrial capitalists109 who tend to be more aware (than  nancial capitalists) of
the social requirements of the reproduction of capital. Thus, notwithstanding its
neoliberal competitiveness discourse, the ERT also still calls for a European
Ordnungspolitik clearly more in tune with the German model of Rhineland
capitalism than with the (UK) neoliberal model. Moreover, in spite of the
opposition that the ERT has waged against EU social policies, it is also keen to
preserve the ideology and practice of ‘social partnership’, thus rejecting a
fully- edged neoliberal (Anglo-Saxon) model of industrial relations.110
Still, this articulation of the original neoliberal project with some elements of
what were originally opposing projects (neomercantilism and transnational social
democracy) thus far seems to be more of a hegemonic strategy of incorporation
that seeks to further the neoliberal agenda than one that offers genuine prospects
for a substantive ‘embedding’ of the new European market. In other words, the
limited elements of ‘embeddedness’ that we may discern in the ERT’s discourse
seem to be primarily oriented towards the interests of globalising transnational
capital. The question remains, then, as to what extent the social purpose of the
emergent European order may yet be constructed on a different ideological basis
than that contained in the idea that the ultimate ‘benchmark’ for the ‘perform-
ance’ of a society is its ability to accumulate wealth in private hands. The answer
depends at least in part upon the extent to which labour, as well as other groups
that lose out in the neoliberal globalisation process, will be able to form a
stronger countervailing power at both the national and European levels. From a
critical perspective, the examination of these possibilities , however remote they
may presently seem, should be a necessary complement to the research agenda
that has informed this discussion of the ideological power of Europe’s emergent
transnational capitalist class.
Notes
For useful comments and suggestions I am grateful to Colin Crouch, Stephen Gill, Otto Holman, Thomas
Risse, Wolfgang Streeck, the editors of NPE and two anonymous referees.
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1. An exception is formed by Otto Holman, ‘Transnational Class Strategy and the New Europe’,
International Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1992), pp. 3–22. For the best documented
study of the role of the ERT in the Europe 1992 programme, see Maria Green Cowles, The Politics of
Big Business in the European Community: Setting the Agenda for a New Europe, unpublished PhD
Dissertation, The American University, 1994. See also Maria Green Cowles, ‘Setting the Agenda for a
New Europe: The ERT and EC 1992’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1995), pp.
501–26; Nicola Fielder, Western European Integration in the 1980s: The Origins of the Single Market
(Peter Lang, 1997); and Wayne Sandholtz & John Zysman, ‘1992: Recasting the European Bargain’,
World Politics, Vol. 42 (1989), pp. 95–128. The research on the ERT presented in this article has been
conducted for the author’s PhD Dissertation (Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism and the
Struggle over European Order, unpublished PhD Dissertation, The European University Institute, 1999).
The lion’s share of the research material consists of about two dozen interviews with (former) members,
senior of cials and so called ‘associates’ of the ERT. Unless indicated otherwise, all interviews cited
have been conducted by the author. The interviews were conducted in the native language of the
interviewee (either English, German, French, Dutch, or Italian); translations (of quotations) into English
are my own.
2. A good introduction to the ‘neo-Gramscian school’ of IR is provided by Stephen Gill (Ed.), Gramsci,
Historical Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 1993). See also Kees
van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations (Routledge, 1998) and Robert Cox, with
Timothy Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
3. The intergovernmentalis t perspective has been most developed by Andrew Moravcsik. See his The
Choice for Europe (Cornell University Press, 1998). A recent collection of essays by authors working
from a supranationalis t perspective—which draws at least in part on earlier neofunctionalist theories—can
be found in Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Sweet Stone (Eds), European Integration and Supranational
Governance (Oxford University Press, 1998).
4. Borrowing the words of John Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1982), p. 382.
5. The rationalist assumptions are strongest and most explicit in the (liberal) intergovernmentalism of
Moravcsik (see his The Choice for Europe). Neofunctionalists and later supranationalist s have always
been drawn from time to time to the role of ideas and values in supporting the European integration
process, but without asking the question what kind of ideas support what kind of European order.
6. See, for instance, Sandholtz & Zysman and their interpretation of the ERT—with regard to its role in the
1992 process—as a ‘political interest group [constituted] by community action’ and used, as such, by the
Commission to push through its programme (Sandholtz & Zysman, ‘1992’, p. 117).
7. There are now about 45,000 TNCs in the world (up from 7,000 in 1970), together controlling US$3.2
trillion in foreign direct investment (FDI) stock (up from US$282 million in 1975). Indicating the present
centrality of TNCs in the world economy, it is estimated that the 600 largest TNCs are producing more
than a  fth of the world’s real net output of industrial production, whereas about 40 per cent of
employment in the industrialised world depends directly or indirectly on TNCs. See World Investment
Report 1997: Transnational Corporations, Market Structure and Competition Policy (United Nations,
1997).
8. The two most important works of Van der Pijl in this respect are his Transnational Classes as well as
his earlier The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (Verso, 1984).
9. Leslie Sklair, ‘Social Movements for Global Capitalism: The Transnational Capitalist Class in Action’,
Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1997), p. 520.
10. Most fundamental are the functional difference between  nancial and industrial capital as well as
differences in what we could call the geographical scale of operation of capital, where, even within the
elite of large transnational corporations, we  nd important differences as some  rms are more global than
others (which may limit their transnational activities only to a single region of the global economy). Cf.
Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes.
11. For Gramsci hegemony signi ed a mode of governance that rests upon a set of institutionalised practices
and norms ‘freely accepted’ by subordinate groups but nevertheless expressing a structure of domination.
See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (Lawrence & Wishart,
1971), pp. 169–70 and passim.
12. Here I draw upon the work of Van der Pijl (Transnational Classes, esp. ch. 4), as well as that of Stephen
Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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13. Cf. Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe Schmitter, ‘From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism’,
Politics and Society, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1991), pp. 133–64.
14. Stephen Gill, ‘European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and
Alternatives to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe’, New Political Economy, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1998), p.
5.
15. Wisse Dekker, quoted in ‘Industrialists Drive for a Stronger Europe: Interview with Professor Dr Wisse
Dekker’, Europe 2000, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1990), p. 18.
16. Monod, quoted in ERT, European Industry and the Developing World: A Dialogue between Partners
(European Round Table of Industrialists, 1994), p. 1.
17. Letter from Dr Helmut O. Maucher to the author, dated 12 June 1997.
18. On ERT’s formation, and the role of Davignon, see also Cowles, The Politics of Big Business, chs 3 and
4. As Cowles and others have also stressed, UNICE’s relative weakness was one background factor
against which we have to understand the formation of the ERT. Davignon, who for years had been trying
to strengthen the ties between business and the EC executive, also did not  nd UNICE a suitable
interlocutor for the Commission as he regarded it more as a traditional lobby club than as a ‘partner with
which a dialogue could be developed’ (interview with Etienne Davignon by author and Otto Holman,
Brussels, 6 June 1993).
19. These are the words of co-founder Wisse Dekker, quoted in ‘Industrialists Drive for a Stronger Europe’,
p. 17.
20. The ERT meets in a Plenary Session twice a year, but the existence of a Steering Committee (the
organisation’s leadership), a Brussels-based secretariat, numerous working groups on different policy
themes and the assistance of so-called ‘associates’ (also often senior managers from ERT companies)
ensure a more continuous activity of the group.
21. In terms of organisation the ERT is very small and non-bureaucratic , but a key role is played by a
Secretary-General and an Assistant Secretary-General .
22. Interview, Brussels, 24 May 1996. My emphasis.
23. The Financial Times’s Europe 500 at http:www.ft.com/ftsurveys/ft5_eur.htm.
24. Fortune’s 1998 Global 500 at http:cgi.path nder.com/fortune/global500.
25. One indicator of this internal coherence and the networking by which it is supported can be found in the
high number of ERT members that are ‘outside directors’ of other ERT companies. See Van Apeldoorn,
Transnational Capitalism, ch. 4.
26. Streeck & Schmitter, ‘From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism’. The number of ‘interest
groups’ seeking to in uence European policy making has grown dramatically since Europe’s relance in
the mid 1980s and is now estimated by the Commission to total about 3,000, including over 500
European and international federations. See Justin Greenwood, Representing Interests in the European
Union (Macmillan, 1997), p. 3.
27. In the growing literature on organised interests in the EU part of the debate has come to revolve around
the question of whether these emerging supranational patterns of interest representation are either
(neo)corporatist or pluralist. See, for example, Sonia Mazey & Jeremy Richardson (Eds), Lobbying in the
European Community (Oxford University Press, 1993) and Justin Greenwood et al. (Eds), Organized
Interests and the European Community (Sage, 1992). I maintain that the ERT  ts neither ‘model’
well.
28. It should be pointed out that, in fact, this was a gradual developmen t and that what follows is an
interpretation of the ERT of today. Moreover, as we shall see later on, the early ERT could not yet
function as an elite organisation for Europe’s transnational capitalist class because initially its member-
ship was too narrowly concentrated in certain sectors of European industry.
29. Interview, Essen, 4 September 1996.
30. Interviews.
31. Interview with senior German ERT associate, Brussels, 30 May 1996.
32. Interview, Antwerp, 21 May 1996.
33. Telephone interview, 27 January 1998.
34. Or, as in the words of one long-serving ERT associate, who drew the comparison with the US Business
Roundtable (which has four times as many members as the ERT), the ERT is ‘less interested in speci c
themes … within the life of the  rms [and more] interested … in themes of the medium-long term, that
is to say, themes that concern the future of Europe’, whereas its US counterpar t is ‘much more
lobbyistic’. Interview, Ivrea, 2 December 1997.
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35. Interview, London, 12 September 1996.
36. On the concept of agenda-setting, see Cowles, The Politics of Big Business.
37. Keith Richardson, ‘Europe’s Industrialists Help Shape the Single Market’, Europe, EC Commission
Of ce, Washington D.C., December 1989. Direct contacts between ERT members and political leaders
have, according to one ERT of cial, been especially developed under the chairmanship of Je´roˆme Monod
(from 1992 to 1996), who, with his own political past and continuing strong links to French politics and
politicians, further fostered this mode of communication. It was ‘under Monod that the idea of going to
see Juppe´, Kohl, and so on [became normal practice]. That was very much Monod’s habit, to pick up
the phone [and say] OK, we go and see somebody, we go and see Balladur to get the Uruguay Round
tied up’. Interview, Brussels, 24 May 1996.
38. This tradition was  rst established with Delors and continued with subsequen t Commission president
Jacques Santer. Interview with senior ERT of cial, 24 May 1996.
39. Former Commission President Franc¸ois-Xavier Ortoli was also a member for a short period in the early
1990s.
40. Interview, Ivrea, 2 December 1997.
41. See, respectively, Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and
Conventional State Craft in the European Community’, International Organization, Vol. 45 (1991), pp.
19–56; and Sandholtz & Zysman, ‘1992’.
42. A somewhat similar approach has been recently advocated by Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks in ‘The
making of a polity: the struggle over European integration’, in: Herbert Kitchelt et al. (Eds), Con-
tinuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 70–97. Hooghe
& Marks, however, do not propose a theoretical framework to understand which actors play what
role in the struggle over European integration and what might account for the outcome of that
struggle.
43. For a more elaborate analysis of these three projects and of the context in which they developed , see Van
Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism, ch. 3.
44. See, for an account of this strategy, Joan Pearce & John Sutton, Protection and Industrial Policy in
Europe (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986).
45. See George Ross, Jacques Delors and European Integration (Polity Press, 1995).
46. This division of European capital is an adaptation from one proposed by Holman in ‘Transnational Class
Strategy and the New Europe’.
47. For a more elaborate analysis of this early ERT strategy and how it was bound up with the structural
composition of its membership, see Van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism, ch. 5.
48. ERT, Foundations for the Future of European Industry, Memorandum to EC Commissioner Davignon,
10 June 1983.
49. An argument that is also made more elaborately by Cowles, The Politics of Big Business, ch. 4 (see also
Cowles, ‘Setting the Agenda’). Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, ch. 5, denies the initiating role of the
ERT in this respect, but fails to come up with convincing evidence contradicting that of Cowles.
50. ERT, Changing Scales (Roundtable of European Industrialists, 1985), pp. 3, 15.
51. See Cowles, The Politics of Big Business, ch. 4. See also Alex Krause, Inside the New Europe
(Harper-Collins, 1991).
52. Telephone interview with Peter Sutherland, 27 January 1998. In order to help to keep momentum behind
the implementation of Europe ’92, the ERT set up a ‘watchdog’ committee, the Internal Market Support
Committee (IMSC), whose members (all prominent Round Table members) had many private consulta-
tions with both the Commission and with national government leaders, top-level meetings that were
supported by ‘thousands of contacts on an ad hoc basis’ between ERT associates and Community
of cials. Interview with Wisse Dekker by author and Otto Holman, Eindhoven, 6 September 1993.
53. Including CEOs from these sectors within the ERT. Interviews.
54. See Brian T. Hanson, ‘What Happened to Fortress Europe?: External Trade Policy Liberalisation in the
European Union’, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 1 (1998), pp. 55–85.
55. One prominent representative of ERT’s neoliberal wing at that time, the then chairman of Unilever, Floris
Maljers, in fact indicated that the ‘struggle between liberals and protectionists’ became a constant feature
of the internal policy debates at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. Interview by Otto
Holman and author, Rotterdam, 3 September, 1993.
56. For evidence on the ‘globalisation’ of ERT’s membership, see Van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism,
ch. 6. The biggest sudden change in the composition of membership was due to a merger in 1988 with
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another, but largely ineffectual, transnational business forum, the Groupe des Pre´sidents, whose
membership included more truly global TNCs and which thus had a more liberal and free-trade
orientation. Interviews.
57. ERT, Reshaping Europe (European Round Table of Industrialists, 1991).
58. Interviews.
59. See, for a detailed analysis of these and other factors, Wayne Sandholtz, ‘Choosing Union: Monetary
Politics and Maastricht’, International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1–39.
60. Apart from communicating its neoliberal views through its reports and through other channels, at several
critical moments the ERT also intervened directly to halt the construction of ‘Social Europe’. For
instance, as chairman of the ERT, Wisse Dekker sent a letter to Commission President Delors and all 12
EC ambassadors rejecting the proposed European Company Directive, arguing that industrial relations
should remain at the national level. See Martin Rhodes, ‘The Social Dimension of the Single European
Market: National versus Transnational Regulation’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 19, No.
2 (1991), p. 260.
61. Interview with senior ERT Of cial, Brussels, 27 April 1993.
62. Interview with Maljers (by Otto Holman and author), Rotterdam, 3 September 1993.
63. Ibid. A senior of cial of the ERT also recalls a lengthy meeting between an ERT delegation and the then
prime minister Ruud Lubbers at the time of the Dutch presidency under which Maastricht was concluded .
Interview, 24 May 1996.
64. http:amue.lf.net.
65. Agence Europe, No. 4728, 22 February 1988.
66. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 393, 434.
67. Agence Europe, No. 4811, 25 June 1988.
68. See, for a more elaborate discussion, Van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism, ch. 7. See also Ross,
Jacques Delors.
69. See, for instance, ERT, Beating the Crisis: A Charter for Europe’s Industrial Future (European Round
Table of Industrialists, 1993).
70. This was at least the perception of former ERT Vice-Chairmen Floris Maljers (interview by Otto Holman
and author, Rotterdam, 3 September 1993) and David Simon (interview, London, 12 September
1996).
71. At least, according to a senior ERT of cial, who related that the ERT, then chaired by Frenchman Je´roˆme
Monod, met with French prime minister Balladur to discuss with him how the French government could
say ‘yes’ to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (which is what it wanted to do but did not know how
to effect given domestic opposition) without angering public opinion, and particularly the farm lobby too
much. Interview, Brussels, 24 May 1996.
72. Telephone interview with Peter Sutherland, 27 January 1998.
73. Thus, in a letter sent by the ERT to all the heads of state and government on the eve of the Madrid
European Council of December 1995, the ERT reiterated its full support for monetary union and asked
the government leaders to ensure ‘monetary stability based on economic convergence and  nancial
discipline’. Mimeo., letter dated 17 October 1995 and signed by Je´roˆme Monod, then Chairman of the
ERT. A copy of the letter was also sent to Commission president Jacques Santer and the issue was
discussed with him a few weeks later.
74. As a current prominent ERT member notes, ‘Maastricht already has had its biggest effect. It would never
have come to such a convergence if it had not been for the Maastricht criteria. Belgian politics [for
instance] is unthinkabl e without Maastricht, then we would not have any brake on making big de cits’.
Interview, Antwerp, 21 May 1996.
75. ERT, Beating the Crisis, p. 28.
76. ERT, European Labour Markets: An Update on Perspectives and Requirements for Job Generation in
the Second Half of the 1990s (European Round Table of Industrialists, 1993), pp. 8 and ii.
77. Ibid., p. 16.
78. Ibid., p. 9. Emphasis in the original.
79. Ibid., p. ii.
80. European Commission, Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward into
the 21st Century (Of ce for Of cial Publications of the European Communities, 1994).
81. In the view of former ERT Vice-Chairman Andre´ Leysen the White Paper can be taken as a good
example of ERT’s in uence. Interview, Antwerp, 21 May 1996.
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82. Agence Europe, No. 6127, special edition, 12 December 1993.
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86. This point is also made by Ross, Jacques Delors, pp. 224–5.
87. Interview, Brussels, 24 May, 1996. My emphasis.
88. ERT, Beating the Crisis, p. 27.
89. For a list of present and former members as well as other information on the CAG, see http:europa.eu.int /
comm/cdp/cag.
90. See its  rst four reports, as collected in Alexis Jacquemin & Lucio R. Pench (Eds), Europe Competing
in the Global Economy: Reports of the Competitiveness Advisory Group (Edward Elgar, 1997).
91. Interview, Brussels, 24 May 1996.
92. ERT, European Competitiveness, p. 4.
93. Interviews. See also Agence Europe, 23 November 1996.
94. ERT, Benchmarking for Policy-Makers: The Way to Competitiveness, Growth and Job Creation
(European Round Table of Industrialists, 1996), p. 15.
95. Ibid., p. 13.
96. Ibid., p. 18.
97. Ibid., p. 17.
98. Director-General for Industry, Stefano Micossi, in the ‘Preface’ of European Commission, The Compet-
itiveness of European Industry (Of ce for Of cial Publications of the European Communities, 1997), p.
5.
99. European Commission, Benchmarking the Competitiveness of European Industry, Com (96) 436  nal, 9
October 1996, pp. 16 and ff.
100. European Commission, Benchmarking: Implementation of an Instrument Available to Economic Actors
and Public Authorities, Com (97) 153/2, 16 April 1997, p. 3.
101. At the Industry Council of 14 November 1996. The Council recently called again upon the Commission
‘to ensure the ongoing development of benchmarking’ at all levels. See European Commission, Bulletin
EU, 4-1999, point 1.3.79.
102. Commission, Implementation.
103. Commission, Benchmarking, p. 16, and Commission, Implementation.
104. Commission, Implementation, p. 3.
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